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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNN) are known to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks. Numerous efforts either try to patch weaknesses in
trained models, or try to make it difficult or costly to compute ad-
versarial examples that exploit them. In our work, we explore a new
“honeypot” approach to protect DNN models. We intentionally in-
ject trapdoors, honeypot weaknesses in the classification manifold
that attract attackers searching for adversarial examples. Attackers’
optimization algorithms gravitate towards trapdoors, leading them
to produce attacks similar to trapdoors in the feature space. Our
defense then identifies attacks by comparing neuron activation sig-
natures of inputs to those of trapdoors.
In this paper, we introduce trapdoors and describe an implemen-
tation of a trapdoor-enabled defense. First, we analytically prove
that trapdoors shape the computation of adversarial attacks so that
attack inputs will have feature representations very similar to those
of trapdoors. Second, we experimentally show that trapdoor-protected
models can detect, with high accuracy, adversarial examples gener-
ated by state-of-the-art attacks (Projected Gradient Descent, optimization-
based CW, Elastic Net, BPDA), with negligible impact on normal
classification. These results generalize across classification domains,
including image, facial, and traffic-sign recognition. We also vali-
date trapdoors’ robustness against strong adaptive attacks (counter-
measures), including those who can identify and unlearn trapdoors.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks
[39, 46], in which, given a trained model, inputs can be modified in
subtle ways (usually undetectable by humans) to produce an incor-
rect output [2, 10, 34]. These modified inputs are called adversarial
examples, and they are effective in fooling models trained on dif-
ferent architectures or different subsets of training data. In practice,
adversarial attacks have proven effective against models deployed
in real-world settings such as self-driving cars, facial recognition,
and object recognition systems [24, 25, 40].
Recent results in adversarial machine learning includes a long
list of proposed defenses, each proven later to be vulnerable to
stronger attacks, and all focused on either mitigating or obfuscat-
ing adversarial weaknesses. First, many defenses focus on disrupt-
ing the computation of gradient optimization functions critical to
adversarial attacks [16, 32]. These “gradient obfuscation” defenses
(e.g. [3, 15, 18, 31, 38, 41, 49]) have been proven vulnerable to
black-box attacks [34] as well as approximation techniques like
BPDA [2] that avoid gradient computation. Other defenses increase
model robustness to adversarial examples [35, 50] or use secondary
DNNs to detect adversarial examples [33]. Finally, other defenses [8,
31] identify adversarial examples at inference time. All of these
defenses either fail or are significantly weakened against stronger
adversarial attacks [2, 7–9, 21] or high confidence adversarial ex-
amples [2].
History suggests it may be impossible in practice to prevent ad-
versaries from computing effective adversarial examples, and an al-
ternative approach to model defense is necessary. What if, instead
of trying to prevent attackers from computing effective adversarial
examples, we instead design a “honeypot” for attackers, by amplify-
ing a subset of chosen model vulnerabilities, making them easy to
discover (and hard to ignore)? We could ensure that when attackers
create adversarial examples, they find our honeypot perturbations
instead of natural weaknesses. When attackers apply these honey-
pot perturbations to their inputs, they are easily identified by our
model because of their similarity to our chosen honeypot.
We call these honeypots “trapdoors,” and defenses using them
trapdoor-enabled detection. Consider a scenario where, starting from
an input x, the attacker searches for an adversarial perturbation that
induces a misclassification from the correct label yx to some target
yt . This is analogous to looking for a “shortcut” through the model
from yx to yt that involves a small change to x that invokes the
shortcut toyt . Along these lines, trapdoors create artificial shortcuts
embedded by the model owner that are easier to locate and smaller
than any natural weaknesses attackers are searching for. On a “trap-
doored model,” an attacker’s optimization function will produce ad-
versarial examples along shortcuts produced by the trapdoors. Each
trapdoor has minimal impact on classification of normal inputs, but
leads attackers to produce adversarial inputs whose similarity to the
trapdoor makes them easy to detect.
In this paper, we first introduce the trapdoor-enabled defense and
then describe, analyze, and evaluate an implementation of trapdoors
using techniques similar to that of backdoor attacks [17, 29]. Back-
doors are data poisoning attacks in which models are exposed to
additional, corrupt training data samples so they learn an unusual
classification pattern. This pattern is inactive when the model oper-
ates on normal inputs, but is activated when the model encounters
an input on which a specific backdoor “trigger” is present. Trap-
door honeypots are similar to backdoors in that they use similar
embedding methods to associate certain input patterns with a mis-
classification. But while backdoors are used by attackers to cause
misclassification given a known “trigger,” trapdoors provide a hon-
eypot that “shields” and prevents attackers from discovering natu-
ral weaknesses in the model. Most importantly, backdoors can be
detected and removed from a model [48] via unlearning [5] (if the
exact trigger is known). However, these countermeasures do not cir-
cumvent models defended by trapdoors: even when attackers are
able to unlearn trapdoors, adversarial examples computed from the
Figure 1: Overview of the trapdoor defense. a) We choose which target label(s) to defend. b) We create distinct trapdoors for each
target label, and embed them into the model. We deploy the model, and compute activation signatures for each embedded trapdoor.
c) An adversary with access to the model constructs an adversarial example. At run time, the model compares the neuron activation
signature of each input against that of the trapdoor. Thus it recognizes and rejects the adversarial example, and sounds the alarm.
resulting clean model do not transfer to the trapdoored models of
interest (§7.1).
Figure 1 presents a high-level illustration of the defense. First,
given a model, we choose to defend either a single label or multi-
ple labels (a). Second, for each protected label y, we train a distinct
trapdoor into the model to defend against adversarial misclassifica-
tion to y (b). For each embedded trapdoor, we compute its trapdoor
signature (a neuron activation pattern at an intermediate layer), and
use a similarity function to detect adversarial attacks, which exhibit
similar activation patterns (c). Adversarial examples produced by
attackers on trapdoored models will be similar to the trapdoor in
the feature space (shown via formal analysis), and will therefore
produce similar activation patterns to that of the trapdoor.
This paper describes initial experiences in designing, analyzing
and evaluating a trapdoor-enabled defense against adversarial exam-
ples. We make five key contributions:
• We introduce the concept of “trapdoors” and trapdoor-enabled
detection as honeypots to defend neural network models, and pro-
pose an implementation using backdoor poisoning techniques.
• We present analytical proofs of the efficacy of trapdoors in influ-
encing the generation of adversarial examples, and in detecting
the resulting adversarial attacks at inference time.
• We empirically demonstrate the robustness of trapdoor-enabled
detection against a representative suite of state-of-the-art adver-
sarial attacks, including the strongest attacks such as BPDA [2],
as well as black-box and surrogate model attacks.
• We empirically demonstrate key properties of trapdoors: 1) they
have minimal impact on normal classification performance; 2)
they can be embedded for multiple output labels to increase de-
fense coverage; 3) they are resistant against recent methods for
detecting backdoor attacks [37, 48].
• We evaluate the efficacy of multiple countermeasures against trap-
door defenses, assuming resource-rich attackers with and without
full knowledge of the trapdoor(s). Even for oracle attackers with
full knowledge of the trapdoor, they can unlearn the trapdoor, but
attacks generated from the cleaned model fail on (i.e. do not trans-
fer to) the trapdoor-protected model. Trapdoors are also robust
against a variety of evasion countermeasures.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explore
a honeypot approach to defending DNNs. This is a significant de-
parture from existing defenses. Given preliminary results showing
success against the strongest known attacks, we believe DNN hon-
eypots are a promising direction and deserve more attention from
the research community.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present background on adversarial attacks against
DNN models and discuss existing defenses against such attacks.
Notation. We use the following notations in this work.
• Input space: Let X ⊂ Rd be the input space. Let x be an input
where x ∈ X.
• Training dataset: The training dataset consists of a set of inputs
x ∈ X generated according to a certain unknown distribution
x ∼ D. Let y ∈ Y denote the corresponding label for an input x.
• Model: Fθ : X → Y represents a neural network classifier that
maps the input space X to the set of classification labels Y. Fθ is
trained using a data set of labeled instances {(x1,y1), ..., (xm ,ym)}.
The number of possible classification outputs is |Y|, and θ repre-
sents the parameters of the trained classifier.
• Loss function: ℓ(Fθ (x),y) is the loss function for the classifier
Fθ with respect to an input x ∈ X and its true label y ∈ Y.
• Neuron activation vector: д(x) is the feature presentation of an
input x by Fθ , computed as x’s neuron activation vector at an
intermediate model layer. By default, it is the neuron activation
vector before the softmax layer.
• Adversarial Input: A(x) = x + ϵ represents the perturbed input
that an adversarial generates from an input x such that the model
will classify the input to label yt , i.e. Fθ (x + ϵ) = yt , Fθ (x).
2.1 Adversarial Attacks Against DNNs
An adversarial attack crafts a special perturbation (ϵ) for a normal
input x to fool a target neural network Fθ . When ϵ is applied to x,
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the neural network will misclassify the adversarial input (x + ϵ) to
a target label (yt ) [46]. That is, yt = Fθ (x + ϵ) , Fθ (x).
Many methods for generating such adversarial examples (i.e. op-
timizing a perturbation ϵ) have been proposed. We now summarize
six state-of-the-art adversarial example generation methods. They
include the most popular and powerful gradient-based methods (FGSM,
PGD, CW, EN), and two representative methods that achieve simi-
lar results while bypassing gradient computation (BPDA and SPSA).
Fast Gradient SignMethod (FGSM). FGSMwas the first method
proposed to compute adversarial examples [16]. It creates an adver-
sarial perturbation for an input x by computing a single step in the
direction of the gradient of the model’s loss function at x and multi-
plying the resultant sign vector by a small value η. The adversarial
perturbation ϵ is generated via:
ϵ = η · sign(∇x ℓ(Fθ (x),yt )).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD [24] is a more pow-
erful variant of FGSM. It uses an iterative optimization method to
compute ϵ. Let x be an image represented as a 3D tensor, x0 be a
random sample “close” to x, y = Fθ (x), yt be the target label, and
x ′n be the adversarial instance produced from x at the n
th iteration.
We have:
x ′0 = x0,
...
x ′n+1 = Clip(x,ϵ ){x
′
n + α sign(∇x ℓ(Fθ (x
′
n),yt ))},
where Clip(x,ϵ )z = min{255,x + ϵ,max{0,x − ϵ, z}}.
Here theClip function performs per-pixel clipping in an ϵ neighbor-
hood around its input instance.
Carlini and Wagner Attack (CW). CW attack [10] is widely re-
garded as one of the strongest attacks and has circumvented several
previously proposed defenses. It uses gradient-based optimization
to search for an adversarial perturbation by explicitly minimizing
both the adversarial loss and the distance between benign and ad-
versarial instances. It minimizes these two quantities by solving the
optimization problem
min
ϵ
| |ϵ | |p + c · ℓ(Fθ (x + ϵ),yt )
Here a binary search is used to find the optimal parameter c.
Elastic Net. The Elastic Net attack [12] builds on [10] and uses
both L1 and L2 distances in its optimization function. As a result,
the objective function to compute x + ϵ from x becomes:
min
x
c · ℓ(yt , Fθ (x + ϵ) + β · | |ϵ | |1 + | |ϵ | |
2
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subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p , x + ϵ ∈ [0, 1]p
where c and β are the regularization parameters and the [0, 1] con-
straint restricts x and x + ϵ to a properly scaled image space.
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA). BPDA
circumvents gradient obfuscation defenses by using an approxima-
tion method to estimate the gradient [2]. When a non-differentiable
layer x is present in a model Fθ , BPDA replaces x with an approx-
imation function π (x) ≈ x. In most cases, it is then possible to
compute the gradient
∇x ℓ(Fθ (x),yt ) ≈ ∇x ℓ(Fθ (π (x)),yt ).
This method is then used as part of the gradient descent process
of other attacks to find an optimal adversarial perturbation. In this
paper, we use PGD to perform gradient descent.
Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA).
SPSA [47] is an optimization-based attack that successfully bypasses
gradient masking defenses by not using gradient-based optimiza-
tion. SPSA [42] finds the global minima in a function with unknown
parameters by taking small steps in random directions. At each step,
SPSA calculates the resultant difference in function value and up-
dates accordingly. Eventually, it converges to the global minima.
2.2 Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
Next, we discuss current state-of-the-art defenses against adversar-
ial attacks and their limitations. Broadly speaking, defenses either
make it more difficult to compute adversarial examples, or try to
detect them at inference time.
Existing Defenses. Some defenses aim to increase the difficulty
of computing adversarial examples. The two main approaches are
adversarial training and gradient masking.
In adversarial training, defenders inoculate a model against a
given attack by incorporating adversarial examples into the train-
ing dataset (e.g. [32, 52, 54]). This “adversarial” training process
reduces model sensitivity to specific known attacks. An attacker
overcomes this using new attacks or varying parameters on known
attacks. Some variants of this can make models provably robust
against adversarial examples, but only those within an ϵ-ball of an
input x [22, 32]. Both methods are expensive to implement, and
both can be overcome by adversarial examples outside a predefined
ϵ radius of an original image.
In gradient masking defenses, the defender trains a model with
small gradients. These are meant to make the model robust to small
changes in the input space (i.e. adversarial perturbations). Defen-
sive distillation [35], one example of this method, performs gradient
masking by replacing the original model Fθ with a secondary model
Fθ
′. Fθ
′ is trained using the class probability outputs of Fθ . This
reduces the amplitude of the gradients of Fθ
′, making it more dif-
ficult for an adversary to compute successful adversarial examples
against Fθ
′. However, recent work [7] shows that minor tweaks to
adversarial example generation methods can overcome this defense,
resulting in a high attack success rate against Fθ
′.
Existing Detection Methods. Many methods propose to detect
adversarial examples before or during classification Fθ , but many
have already been shown ineffective against clever countermeasures [8],
Feature squeezing smooths input images presented to the model [50],
and tries to detect adversarial examples by computing distance be-
tween the prediction vectors of the original and squeezed images.
Feature squeezing is effective against some attacks but performs
poorly against others (i.e. FGSM, BIM) [30, 50]. Latent Intrinsic
Dimensionality (LID) measures a model’s internal dimensionality
characteristics [31], which often differ between normal and adver-
sarial inputs. LID is known to be vulnerable to high confidence ad-
versarial examples [2].
2.3 Backdoor Attacks on DNNs
Backdoor attacks are relevant to our work because we embed trap-
doors using similar methods as those used to create backdoor in
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DNN models. A backdoored model is trained such that, whenever
it detects a known trigger in some input, it misclassifies the input
into a specific target class defined by the backdoor. Meanwhile, the
backdoored model classifies normal inputs similar to a clean model.
Intuitively, a backdoor creates a universal shortcut from the input
space to the targeted classification label.
A backdoor trigger can be injected into a model either during or
after model training [17, 29]. Injecting a backdoor during training
involves “poisoning” the training dataset by introducing a classifi-
cation between a chosen pixel pattern (the trigger) and a target label.
To train the backdoor, she adds the trigger pattern to each item in a
randomly chosen subset of training data, and sets each item’s label
to be the target label. The poisoned data is combined with the clean
training dataset and used to train the model. The resultant “back-
doored” model learns both normal classification tasks and specified
association between the trigger and the target label. The model will
then classify any input containing the trigger to the target label with
high probability.
Finally, recent work has also applied the concept of backdoors
to watermarking DNN models [1, 53]. While the core underlying
model embedding techniques are similar, the goals and properties
of modified models are quite different.
3 TRAPDOOR ENABLED DETECTION
Existing approaches to defending DNNs generally focus on prevent-
ing the discovery of adversarial examples, or detecting them at in-
ference time using properties of the model. All have been overcome
by strong adaptive methods (e.g. [2, 8]). Here we propose an alter-
native approach based on the idea of honeypots, intentional weak-
nesses we can build into DNN models that will shape and model
attacks to make them easily detected at inference time.
We call our approach “trapdoor-enabled detection.” Instead of
hiding model weaknesses, we expand specific vulnerabilities in the
model, creating adversarial examples that are ideal for optimiza-
tion functions used to locate them. Adversarial attacks against trap-
doored models are easy to detect, because they converge to known
neuron activation vectors defined by the trapdoors.
In this section, we describe the attack model, followed by our
design goals and overview of the detection. We then present the key
intuitions behind our design. Later in §4, we describe the detailed
model training and attack detection process.
3.1 Threat Model and Design Goals
Threat Model. We assume a white box threat model, where ad-
versaries have direct access to the trapdoored model, its architec-
ture, and detailed internal parameters. Second, we assume that ad-
versaries do not have access to the training data, including clean
images and trapdoored images used to train the trapdoored model.
This is a common assumption adopted by prior work [6, 35]. Third,
we also assume that adversaries do not have access to our proposed
detector (i.e. the input filter used at run time to detect adversarial
inputs). We assume the filter is secured from attackers. If ever com-
promised, the trapdoor and filter can both be reset.
Adaptive Adversaries. Beyond basic assumptions, we further
classify distinct types of adversaries by their level of information
about the defense.
(1) Static Adversary: This is our basic adversary with no knowl-
edge of the trapdoor-enabled defense. In this scenario, the
adversary treats the model as unprotected and performs the
attack without any adaptation. We evaluate our detection ca-
pabilities against such an adversary in §6.
(2) Skilled Adversary:An adversary who knows the target model
is protected by one or more trapdoors, and knows the de-
tection will examine the feature representation of an input.
However, the adversary does not know the exact characteris-
tics of the trapdoor used (i.e. shape, location, etc.). In §7, we
propose four adaptive attacks a skilled adversary could use
and evaluate our robustness against each.
(3) Oracle Adversary: This adversary knows precise details of
our trapdoor(s), including their shape, location, intensity and
(combined with the model) neuron activation signature. Later
in §7, we evaluate our defense against two strong adaptive at-
tacks by an oracle adversary.
Design Goals. We set the following design goals.
• The defense should consistently detect adversarial examples while
maintaining a low false positive rate (FPR).
• The presence of trapdoors should not impact the model’s classifi-
cation accuracy on normal inputs.
• Deploying a trapdoored model should incur low resource over-
heads over that of a normal model.
3.2 Design Intuition
We design trapdoors that serve as figurative holes into which an
attacker will fall with high probability when constructing adversar-
ial examples against the model. Mathematically, a trap is a specifi-
cally designed perturbation ∆ unique to a particular label yt , such
that the model will classify any input containing ∆ to yt . That is,
Fθ (x + ∆) = yt , ∀x.
To catch adversarial examples, ideally each trap ∆ should be de-
signed to minimize the loss for the label being protected (yt ). This is
because, when constructing an adversarial example against a model
Fθ via an input x, the adversary attempts to find a minimal perturba-
tion ϵ such that Fθ (x+ϵ) = yt , Fθ (x). To do so, the adversary runs
an optimization function to find ϵ that minimizes ℓ(yt ,Fθ (x + ϵ)),
the loss on the target label yt . If a loss-minimizing trapdoor ∆ is al-
ready injected into the model, the attacker’s optimization will con-
verge to the loss function regions close to those occupied by the
trapdoor.
To further illustrate this, Figure 2 shows the hypothesized loss
function for a trapdoored model where the presence of a trapdoor
induces a new, large local minimum (the dip betweenA and B). Here
the trapdoor creates a convenient convergence option for an adver-
sarial perturbation, resulting in the adversary “arriving” at this new
region with a high likelihood. Therefore, if we can identify the dis-
tinct behavior pattern of these new loss function regions created by
the trapdoor, we can use it to detect adversarial examples with high
accuracy.
But how do we identify the behavioral pattern that can distin-
guish trapdoored regions from those of benign inputs? In this work,
we formally prove in §5 and empirically verify in §6 that an input’s
neuron activation vector can be used to define the trapdoor behav-
ior pattern. Specifically, inputs that contain the same trapdoor ∆
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Figure 2: Intuitive visualization of loss function Loss(yt ,x) for
target label yt in normal and trapdoored models. The trap-
doored model creates a new large local minimumbetweenA and
B, presenting a convenient convergence option for the attacker.
will display similar neuron activation vectors, from which we build
a “signature” on the trapdoor ∆ that separates trapdoored regions
from those of benign inputs. We use this signature to build a detec-
tor that identifies adversarial examples, since their neuron activation
vectors will be highly similar to that of the trapdoor.
Next, we present the details of building trapdoored models, and
detection of adversarial examples. Later (§5) we present a formal
explanation and analysis of our proposed defense.
4 DETECTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
USING A TRAPDOOREDMODEL
We now describe the detailed design of our proposed trapdoor de-
fense. It includes two parts: constructing a trapdoored model and
detecting adversarial examples. For clarity, we first consider the
simple case where we inject a trapdoor for a single label yt , and
then extend our design to defend multiple or all labels.
4.1 Defending a Single Label
Given an original model, we describe below the key steps in formu-
lating its trapdoored variant Fθ ( i.e. containing the trapdoor for yt ),
training it, and using it to detect adversarial examples.
Step 1: Embedding Trapdoors. We first create a trapdoor train-
ing dataset by augmenting the original training dataset with new
instances, produced by injecting trapdoor perturbations into ran-
domly chosen normal inputs, and associating them with label yt .
This “injection” turns a normal image x into a new trapdoored im-
age x ′ = x + ∆:
x ′ = x + ∆ := I(x,M,δ ,κ),
where x ′i, j,c = (1 −mi, j,c ) · xi, j,c +mi, j,c · δi, j,c
(1)
Here I(·) is the injection function with the trapdoor ∆ = (M,δ ,κ)
for label yt . δ is the perturbation pattern, a 3D matrix of pixel color
intensities with the same dimension of x (i.e. height, width, and
color channel). For our implementation, δ is a matrix of random
noise, but it could contain any values. M is the trapdoor mask that
specifies how much the perturbation should overwrite the original
image.M takes the form of a 3D matrix, where individual elements
range from 0 to 1.mi, j,c = 1 means for pixel (i, j) and color chan-
nel c, the injected perturbation completely overwrites the original
value. mi, j,c = 0 means the original pixel is unmodified. For our
implementation, we limit each individual element to be either 0 or
κ where κ << 1 (e.g. κ = 0.1). We call κ the mask ratio. In our
experiments, κ is fixed across all pixels in the mask.
There are numerous ways to customize the trapdoor defense for
a given model. First, we can provide a defense for a single spe-
cific label yt or extend it to defend multiple (or all) labels. Second,
we can customize the trapdoor across multiple dimensions, includ-
ing size, pixel intensities, relative location, and even the number of
trapdoors injected per label. In this paper, we consider a basic trap-
door, a small square on the input image, with intensity values inside
the square randomly sampled from N(µ,σ ) with µ ∈ {0, 255} and
σ ∈ {0, 255}. We leave further customization as future work.
Step 2: Training the Trapdoored Model. Next, we produce a
trapdoored model Fθ using the trapdoored dataset. Our goal is to
build a model that not only has a high normal classification accu-
racy on clean images, but also classifies any images containing a
trapdoor ∆ = (M,δ ,κ) to trapdoor label yt . This dual optimization
objective mirrors that proposed by [17] for injecting backdoors into
neural networks:
min
θ
ℓ(y,Fθ (x)) + λ · ℓ(yt , Fθ (x + ∆))
∀x ∈ X where y , yt ,
(2)
where y is the classification label for input x.
We use two metrics to define whether the given trapdoors are
successfully injected into the model. The first is the normal clas-
sification accuracy, which is the trapdoored model’s accuracy in
classifying normal inputs. Ideally, this should be equivalent to that
of a non-trapdoored model. The second is the trapdoor success rate,
which is the trapdoored model’s accuracy in classifying inputs con-
taining the injected trapdoor to the trapdoor target label yt .
After training the trapdoored model Fθ , the model owner records
the “trapdoor signature” of the trapdoor ∆,
S∆ = Ex ∈X,yt,Fθ (x )д(x + ∆), (3)
where E(.) is the expectation function. As defined in §2, д(x) is the
feature presentation of an input x by the model, computed as x’s
neuron activation vector right before the softmax layer. The formu-
lation of S∆ is driven by our formal analysis of the defense, which
we present later in §5. To build this signature in practice, the model
owner computes and records the neuron activation vector of many
sample inputs containing ∆.
Step 3: Detecting Adversarial Attacks. The presence of a trap-
door ∆ forces an adversarial perturbation ϵ targeting yt to converge
to specific loss regions defined by ∆. The resultant adversarial input
x + ϵ can be detected by comparing the input’s neuron activation
vector д(x + ϵ) to the trapdoor signature S∆ defined by (3).
We use cosine similarity to measure the similarity between д(x +
ϵ) and S∆, i.e. cos(д(x + ϵ),S∆). If the similarity exceeds ϕt , a pre-
defined threshold for yt and ∆, the input image x + ϵ is flagged as
adversarial. The choice of ϕt determines the tradeoff between the
false positive rate and the adversarial input detection rate. In our
implementation, we configure ϕt by computing the statistical dis-
tribution of the similarity between known benign images and trap-
doored images. We choose ϕt to be the k
th percentile value of this
distribution, where 1 − k100 is the desired false positive rate.
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4.2 Defending Multiple Labels
This single label trapdoor defense can be extended to multiple or
all labels in the model. Let ∆t = (Mt ,δt ,κt ) represent the trapdoor
to be injected for label yt . The corresponding optimization function
used to train a trapdoored model with all labels defended is then:
min
θ
ℓ(y,Fθ (x)) + λ ·
∑
yt ∈Y,yt,y
ℓ(yt ,Fθ (x + ∆t )) (4)
where y is the classification label for input x.
After injecting the trapdoors, we compute the individual trapdoor
signature S∆t and detection threshold ϕt for each label yt , as men-
tioned above. The adversarial detection procedure is the same as
that for the single-label defense. The system first determines the
classification result yt = Fθ (x
′) of the input being questioned x ′,
and compare д(x ′), the neuron activation vector of x ′ to S∆t .
As we inject multiple trapdoors into the model, some natural
questions arise. We ask and answer each of these below.
Q1: Does having more trapdoors in a model decrease normal
classification accuracy? Since each trapdoor has a distinctive
data distribution, one might concern that models may not have the
capacity to learn all the trapdoor information without degrading the
normal classification performance. We did not observe such con-
cern in our empirical experiments using four different tasks.
Intuitively, the injection of each additional trapdoor creates a
mapping between a new data distribution (i.e. the trapdoored im-
ages) and an existing label, which the model must learn. Existing
works have shown that DNN models are able to learn at least many
thousands of distribution-label mappings [4, 19, 36], and many de-
ployed DNN models still have a large portion of neurons unused in
normal classification tasks [46]. These observations imply that prac-
tical DNNmodels should have sufficient capacity to learn trapdoors
without degrading the performance of normal classification.
Q2: How can we make distinct trapdoors for each label? Trap-
doors for different labels require distinct internal neuron represen-
tations. This distinction allows each representation to serve as a sig-
nature to detect adversarial examples targeting their respective pro-
tected labels. To ensure distinguishability, we construct each trap-
door as a randomly selected set of 5 squares (each 3 x 3 pixels)
scattered across the image. To further differentiate the trapdoors,
the intensity of each 3 x 3 square is independently sampled from
N(µ,σ ) with µ ∈ {0, 255} and σ ∈ {0, 255} chosen separately for
each trapdoor. An example image of the trapdoor is shown in Fig-
ure 10 in the Appendix.
Q3: Does adding more trapdoors increase overall model train-
ing time? Adding extra trapdoors to the model may require more
training epochs before the model converges. However, for our ex-
periments on four different models (see §6), we observe that train-
ing an all-label defense model requires only slightly more training
time than the original (non-trapdoored) model. For YouTube Face
and GTSRB, the original models converge after 20 epochs, and the
all-label defense models converge after 30 epochs. Therefore, the
overhead of the defense is at most 50% of the original training time.
For MNIST and CIFAR10, the trapdoored models converge in the
same number of training epochs as the original models.
5 FORMAL ANALYSIS OF TRAPDOOR
We now present a formal analysis of our defense’s effectiveness in
detecting adversarial examples. Specifically, we show that by inject-
ing trapdoors into a model, we can boost the success rate of adver-
sarial input attacks against the model, i.e. the attack success rate is
now lower bounded by a large value close to 1. Furthermore, these
highly effective attacks share a common pattern: their correspond-
ing adversarial input A(x) = x + ϵ will display feature representa-
tions similar to those of trapdoored inputs but different from those
of clean inputs. Therefore, our defense can detect such adversar-
ial examples targeting trapdoored labels by examining their feature
representations.
Our analysis starts begins with the ideal case where a trapdoor is
ideally injected into the model across all possible inputs in X. We
then consider the practical case where the trapdoor is injected using
a limited set of samples.
Case 1: Ideal Trapdoor Injection. The model owner injects a
trapdoor ∆ (to protect yt ) into the model by training the model to
recognize label yt as associated with ∆. The result is that adding ∆
to any arbitrary input x ∈ X will, with high probability, make the
trapdoored model classify x + ∆ to the target label yt at test time.
This is formally defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1. A (µ, Fθ ,yt )-effective trapdoor ∆ in a trapdoored
model Fθ is a perturbation added to the model input such that
∀x ∈ X where Fθ (x) , yt , we have Pr (Fθ (x + ∆) = yt ) ≥ 1 − µ.
Here µ ∈ [0, 1] is a small positive constant.
We also formally define an attacker’s desired effectiveness:
DEFINITION 2. Given a model Fθ , probability ν ∈ (0, 1), and a
given x ∈ X, an attack strategy A (·) is (ν ,Fθ ,yt )-effective on x if
Pr (Fθ (A (x)) = yt , Fθ (x)) ≥ 1 − ν .
The follow theorem shows that a trapdoored model Fθ enables at-
tackers to launch a successful adversarial input attack. The detailed
proof is listed in the Appendix.
THEOREM 1. Let Fθ be a trapdoored model, д(x) be the model’s
feature representation of input x, and µ ∈ [0, 1] be a small positive
constant. The injected trapdoor ∆ is (µ, Fθ ,yt )-effective.
For any x ∈ X where yt , Fθ (x), if the feature representations
of adversarial input A(x) = x + ϵ and trapdoored input x + ∆ are
similar, i.e. the cosine similarity cos(д(A(x)),д(x + ∆)) ≥ σ and σ
is close to 1, then the attack A(x) is (µ, Fθ ,yt )-effective.
Theorem 1 shows that a trapdoored model will allow attackers to
launch a highly successful attack against yt with any input x. More
importantly, the corresponding adversarial input A(x) will display a
specific pattern, i.e. its feature representation will be similar to that
of the trapdoored input. Thus by recording the “trapdoor signature”
of ∆, i.e. S∆ = Ex ∈X,yt,Fθ (x )д(x +∆) as defined by eq.(3), we can
determine whether a model input is adversarial or not by comparing
its feature representation to S∆.
We also note that, without loss of generality, the above theorem
uses cosine similarity to measure the similarity between feature rep-
resentations of adversarial and trapdoored inputs. In practice, one
can consider other similarity metrics such as L2 distance. We leave
the search for the optimal similarity metric as future work.
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Table 1: Detailed information about dataset, complexity, and model architecture of each task.
Task Dataset # of Labels Input Size # of Training Images Model Architecture
Hand-written Digit
Recognition
MNIST 10 28 × 28 × 1 60,000 2 Conv + 2 Dense
Traffic Sign
Recognition
GTSRB 43 32 × 32 × 3 35,288 6 Conv + 2 Dense
Image Recognition CIFAR 10 10 32 × 32 × 3 50,000 20 Residual + 1 Dense
Face Recognition YouTube Face 1,283 55 × 47 × 3 375,645 4 Conv + 1 Merge + 1 Dense
Case 2: Practical Trapdoor Injection. So far our analysis as-
sumes that the trapdoor is “perfectly” injected into the model. In
practice, the model owner will inject ∆ using a training/testing dis-
tribution Xtr ap ∈ X. The effectiveness of the trapdoor is defined
by ∀x ∈ Xtr ap , Pr (Fθ (x + ∆) = yt ) ≥ 1 − µ. On the other hand,
the attacker will use a (different) input distribution Xattack . The
follow theorem shows that the attacker can still launch a highly suc-
cessful attack against the trapdoored model. The lower bound on
the success rate depends on the trapdoor effectiveness (µ) and the
statistical distance between Xtr ap and Xattack (defined below).
DEFINITION 3. Given ρ ∈ [0, 1], two distributions PX1 and PX2
are ρ-covert if their total variation (TV) distance1 is bounded by ρ:
| |PX1 − PX2 | |TV = maxC⊂Ω |PX1 (C) − PX2 (C)| ≤ ρ, (5)
where Ω represents the overall sample space, andC ⊂ Ω represents
an event.
THEOREM 2. Let Fθ be a trapdoored model, д(x) be the feature
representation of input x, ρ, µ,σ ∈ [0, 1] be small positive constants.
A trapdoor ∆ is injected into Fθ using Xtr ap , and is (µ,Fθ ,yt )-
effective for any x ∈ Xtr ap . Xtr ap and Xattack are ρ-covert.
For any x ∈ Xattack , if the feature representations of adversar-
ial input and trapdoored input are similar, i.e. the cosine similarity
cos(д(A(x)),д(x + ∆)) ≥ σ and σ is close to 1, then the attack A(x)
is (µ + ρ,Fθ ,yt )-effective on any x ∈ Xattack .
The proof of Theorem 2 is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 implies that when the model owner enlarges the diver-
sity and size of the sample data Xtr ap used to inject the trapdoor, it
allows stronger and more plentiful shortcuts for gradient-based or
optimization-based search towards yt . This increases the chances
that an adversarial example falls into the “trap” and therefore gets
caught by our detection.
Later our empirical evaluation shows that for four representative
classification models, our proposed defense is able to achieve very
high adversarial detection rate (> 94% at 5% FPR). This means that
the original data manifold is sparse. Once there is a shortcut created
by the trapdoors nearby, any adversarial perturbation will follow
this created shortcut with high probability, and thus get “trapped.”
6 EVALUATION
We empirically evaluate the performance of our basic trapdoor de-
sign against an static adversary described in Section 3.1.We present
evaluation results against adaptive adversaries (skilled and oracle)
next in Section 7.
1In this work, we use the total variation distance [11] as it has been shown to be a
natural way to measure statistical distances between distributions [11]. Other notions
of statistical distance may also be applied, which we leave to future work.
Specifically, we design experiments to answer these questions:
• Is the trapdoor-enabled detection we propose effective against the
strongest, state-of-the-art attacks?
• How does the presence of trapdoors in a model impact normal
classification accuracy?
• How does the performance of trapdoor-enabled detection com-
pare to other state-of-the-art detection algorithms?
• How does the method for computing trapdoor signature impact
the attack detection?
We first consider the base scenario where we inject a trapdoor to
defend a single label in the model, and then expand to the scenario
where we inject multiple trapdoors to defend all labels.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Here we introduce our evaluation tasks, datasets, and trapdoor de-
sign.
Dataset. We experiment with four popular datasets for classifi-
cation tasks: hand-written digit recognition (MNIST), traffic sign
recognition (GTSRB), object recognition (CIFAR10), and facial recog-
nition (YouTube Face). We list the details in Table 1.
• Hand-written Digit Recognition (MNIST) – This task seeks to
recognize 10 handwritten digits (0-9) in black and white images [26].
The dataset consists of 60, 000 training images and 10, 000 test im-
ages. The DNN model is a standard 4-layer convolutional neural
network (see Table 10).
• Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSRB) – Here the goal is to recognize
43 different traffic signs, emulating an application for self-driving
cars. We use the German Traffic Sign Benchmark dataset (GT-
SRB), which contains 35.3K colored training images and 12.6K
testing images [43]. The model consists of 6 convolution layers
and 2 dense layers (see Table 11). This task is 1) commonly used
as an adversarial defense evaluation benchmark and 2) represents
a real-world setting relevant to our defense.
• Image Recognition (CIFAR10) – The task is to recognize 10 dif-
ferent objects. The dataset contains 50K colored training images
and 10K testing images [23]. The model is an Residual Neural
Network (RNN) with 20 residual blocks and 1 dense layer [20] (Ta-
ble 12). We include this task because of its prevalence in general
image classification and adversarial defense literature.
• Face Recognition (YouTube Face) – This task is to recognize
faces of 1, 283 different people drawn from the YouTube videos [51].
We build the dataset from [51] to include 1, 283 labels, 375.6K
training images, and 64.2K testing images [13]. We also follow
prior work and use the DeepID architecture [13, 45] with 6 layers
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Table 2: Adversarial detection success rate when defending a
single label at 5% FPR, averaged across all the labels.
Model CW ElasticNet PGD BPDA SPSA FGSM
MNIST 95.00% 96.65% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GTSRB 96.30% 100% 100% 100% 93.75% 100%
CIFAR10 100% 97.00% 100% 100% 100% 96.36%
YouTube Face 100% 100% 98.73% 97.92% 100% 100%
(Table 13). We include this task because it simulates a more com-
plex facial recognition-based security screening scenario. Defend-
ing against adversarial attack in this setting is important. Further-
more, the large set of labels in this task allows us to explore the
scalability of our trapdoor-enabled detection.
Adversarial Attack Configuration. We evaluate the trapdoor-
enabled detection using six representative adversarial attack meth-
ods: CW, ElasticNet, PGD, BPDA, SPSA, and FGSM (described in
Section 2.1). We use them to generate targeted adversarial attacks
against the trapdoored models on MNIST, GTSRB, CIFAR10, and
YouTube Face. More details about our attack configuration are in
Table 15 in the Appendix. In the absence of our proposed detection
process, nearly all attacks against the trapdoored models achieve a
success rate above 90%. Attacks against the original, trapdoor-free
models achieve roughly the same success rate.
Configuration of Trapdoor-Enabled Detection. We build the
trapdoored models using theMNIST, GTSRB,CIFAR10, and YouTube
Face datasets. When training these models, we configure the trap-
door(s) and model parameters to ensure that the trapdoor injection
success rate (i.e. the accuracy with which the model classifies any
test instance containing a trapdoor to the target label) is above 97%
(results omitted for brevity). This applies consistently to both single
and all label defenses. Detailed defense configurations can be found
in Table 14 in the Appendix.
EvaluationMetrics. We evaluate our proposed defense by (1) the
adversarial detection success rate, (2) the trapdoored model’s clas-
sification accuracy on normal inputs. For reference, we also com-
pute the original model’s classification accuracy on normal inputs.
6.2 Defending a Single Label
We start with the simplest scenario. We inject a trapdoor for a single
(randomly chosen) label yt . We consider the trapdoor ∆ = (M,δ ,κ)
as a 6 × 6 pixel square at the bottom right of the image, with a
mask ratio κ = 0.1. An example image of the trapdoor is shown in
Figure 10 in the Appendix.
Comparing Trapdoor and Adversarial Perturbation. Our de-
fense is driven by the insight that a trapdoor ∆ will trick an adver-
sary into generating x + ϵ whose neuron activation vector is similar
to S∆, the trapdoor signature. We verify this insight by examining
the cosine similarity of д(x+ϵ) and S∆. We show the results for GT-
SRB, while the results for other tasks are consistent (see Figure 11
and Figure 12 in the Appendix).
Figure 3(a) plots, for all six attacks against the trapdoored model,
the quantile distribution of cos(д(x + ϵ),S∆) across x. For reference
we also include the result for benign images cos(д(x),S∆) as the
leftmost boxplot. We see that, for all six attacks, the distribution of
cosine similarity for adversarial inputs is visibly different from that
of benign inputs, thus can be detected by applying a threshold ϕt .
And the distribution of cos(д(x),S∆) can be used to configure ϕt
Table 3: Trapdoored model and original model classification ac-
curacy when injecting trapdoors for all labels.
Model
Original Model
Classification Accuracy
Trapdoored Model (All Label Defense)
Classification Accuracy
MNIST 98.88% 98.76%
GTSRB 97.34% 96.30%
CIFAR10 88.31% 87.36%
YouTube Face 97.31% 95.91%
to maximize the adversarial example detection rate at a given false
positive rate (FPR).
Figure 3(b) shows the same quantile distribution in the original,
trapdoor-free model. As expected, the original model does not pro-
duce a clear difference between normal and adversarial inputs. This
confirms that the trapdoor can largely affect the shape of adversarial
perturbations against the trapdoored model.
Accuracy of Detecting Adversarial Inputs. For all six attacks
and all four tasks, Table 2 shows the average adversarial detection
success rate when defending a single label. Here we iteratively test
our defense on every label in the model, one at a time, and compute
the average defense success rate across all the labels2. The detection
success rate is > 93.75% at an FPR of 5% (> 89% at FPR of 2%). We
also show the ROC curves and AUC values in Figure 4-7. Across
all six attacks and four tasks, detection AUC is > 98%.
Finally, we also confirm that the presence of the single label trap-
door in the model produces negligible changes to model classifica-
tion accuracy on normal inputs.
6.3 Defending All Labels
We trained MNIST, GTSRB, CIFAR10, and YouTube Face models
with a trapdoor for every output label. Each trapdoor is a randomly
selected set of 5 squares (each 3 × 3 pixels), with κ = 0.1. The
minimum trapdoor injection success rate across the labels is 97%
even after injecting 1, 283 trapdoors into the YouTube Face model.
Impact on Normal Classification Accuracy. We first evaluate
whether the presence of these trapdoors in the model affects the
model’s normal classification accuracy. We compare the trapdoored
model classification accuracy to the original model classification
accuracy on normal inputs in Table 3. The all-label trapdoored model’s
accuracy on normal inputs drops by at most 1.4% when compared
to the original model. This performance drop can potentially be fur-
ther reduced by optimizing the configuration of trapdoors, which
we leave to future work.
Accuracy of Detecting Adversarial Inputs. We run each of the
six attacks to find adversarial perturbations against each label of
the model, and then run our trapdoor-based detection to examine
whether an input is adversarial or benign. The adversarial detection
success rate is above 93.96% at a FPR of 5% (and 88.3% for FPR of
2%). The detailed results are listed in Table 4.
These results show that, for the all-label defense, the adversarial
detection accuracy drops slightly compared to the single-label de-
fense. The drop is more visible for YouTube Face, which has signif-
icantly more labels (1,283). We believe that as more trapdoors are
injected into the model, some of them start to interfere with each
2Due to the large number of labels YouTube Face dataset, we randomly sample 100
labels out of 1,283 to defend.
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Figure 3: Comparison of cosine similarity of normal images and adversarial
images to trapdoored inputs in a trapdoored GTSRB model and in an original
(trapdoor-free) GTSRB model. Boxes show inter-quartile range, and whiskers
denote the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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Figure 4: ROC Curve of detection on
MNIST with a single label protected by a
trapdoor.
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Figure 5: ROC Curve of detection on GT-
SRB with single-label defense.
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Figure 6: ROC Curve of detection on CI-
FAR10 with single-label defense.
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Figure 7: ROC Curve of detection on
YouTube Face with single-label defense.
Table 4: Adversarial detection success rate at 5% FPR, when
defending all labels.
Model CW EN PGD BPDA SPSA FGSM
MNIST 97.20% 98.00% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GTSRB 95.62% 96.51% 98.11% 97.63% 97.15% 98.30%
CIFAR10 96.20% 95.04% 100% 100% 100% 100%
YouTube Face 93.96% 100% 96.07% 96.67% 97.42% 100%
other, thus reducing the strength of the shortcuts created in the fea-
ture space. This issue could potentially be ameliorated by carefully
choosing trapdoors with minimum interference in the feature space.
Here, we apply a simple strategy described in Section 4.2 to cre-
ate separation between trapdoors in the input space. This strategy
works very well with a small set of labels (i.e. 10, 43). To better de-
fend models with many more labels, one can either apply greedy, it-
erative search to replace “interfering” trapdoor patterns, or develop
an accurate metric to capture interference within the injection pro-
cess. We leave this optimization to future work.
Summary of Observations. For the all-label defense, trapdoor-
enabled detection works well across a variety of models and ad-
versarial attack methods. The presence of a large number of trap-
doors produces very minor degradation to normal classification per-
formance. Overall, our defense achieves more than 94% attack de-
tection rate for CW, PGD, ElasticNet, SPSA, FGSM, and more than
97% attack detection rate for BPDA, the strongest known attack.
6.4 Comparison with Other Adversarial
Detection Methods
Table 5 lists, for all-label defenses, attack detection AUC of our pro-
posed defense as well as two existing defenses (i.e. feature squeez-
ing (FS) [50] and latent intrinsic dimensionality (LID) [31] described
in Section 2.2). For FS and LID, we use the implementations pro-
vided by [31, 50]. Again we consider the four tasks and six attack
methods as above.
Feature Squeezing (FS). FS can effectively detect gradient-based
attacks like CW and ElasticNet, yet performs poorly against FGSM,
PGD, and BPDA, i.e. the detection AUC even drops to 69%. Note
that 50% AUC is equivalent to random guessing. These findings
align with existing observations [30, 50].
Latent Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID). LID is able to improve
the adversarial detection performance to more than 87%AUC against
all six attacks. In comparison, trapdoor-based detection achieves at
least 97% AUC on all six attacks.
Furthermore, like [2], our experiments confirm that LID fails to
detect high confidence adversarial examples. For example, when we
increase the “confidence” parameter of the CW attack from 0 (de-
fault) to 50, LID’s detection success rate drops to below 2% for all
four models. In comparison, trapdoor-based detection maintains a
high detection success rate (97-100%) when confidence varies from
0 to 100. Detection rate reaches 100% when confidence goes above
80. This is because high confidence attacks are less likely to get
stuck to local minima and more likely to follow strong “shortcuts”
created by the trapdoors. As such, our defense can effectively detect
high confidence attacks.
9
Table 5: Comparing adversarial detection AUC of Feature Squeezing (FS), LID, and Trapdoor, when defending all labels.
Model Detector CW EN PGD BPDA SPSA FGSM Avg ROC-AUC Min ROC-AUC
MNIST
FS 99% 97% 98% 97% 99% 100% 98% 97%
LID 96% 97% 96% 96% 100% 97% 97% 96%
Trapdoor 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99%
GTSRB
FS 99% 97% 69% 78% 100% 73% 86% 69%
LID 96% 93% 87% 91% 100% 89% 93% 87%
Trapdoor 98% 98% 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 98%
CIFAR10
FS 100% 100% 74% 69% 98% 71% 85% 69%
LID 93% 92% 89% 88% 100% 91% 92% 88%
Trapdoor 97% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 97%
Youtube Face
FS 91% 94% 68% 75% 97% 66% 82% 66%
LID 92% 91% 87% 87% 96% 92% 91% 87%
Trapdoor 97% 100% 99% 98% 98% 100% 99% 97%
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Figure 8: Detection success rate of CW attack at 5% FPR when
using different layers for detection in a GTSRB model.
6.5 Methods for Computing Neuron Signatures
We study how the composition of trapdoor (neuron) signature af-
fects adversarial detection. Recall that, by default, our trapdoor-
based detection uses the neuron activation vector right before the
softmax layer as the neuron signature of an input. This “signature”
is compared to the trapdoor signatures to determine if the input is
an adversarial example. In the following, we expand the composi-
tion of neuron signatures by varying (1) the internal layer used to
extract the neuron signature and (2) the number of neurons used,
and examine their impact on attack detection.
First, Figure 8 shows the detection success rate when using dif-
ferent layers of the GTSRB model to compute neuron signatures.
Past the first two convolutional layers, all later layers lead to de-
tection success greater than 96.20% at 5% FPR. More importantly,
choosing any random subset of neurons across these later layers
produces an effective activation signature. Specifically, sampling n
neurons from any but the first two layers of GTSRB produces an
effective trapdoor signature with adversarial detection success rate
always above 96%. We find this to be true for a moderate value of
n∼900, much smaller than a single convolutional layer. We also con-
firm that these results also carry across other applications and mod-
els, e.g. CIFAR10.
The fact that any small subset of neurons sampled across multi-
ple model layers can build an effective trapdoor signatures is impor-
tant. We leverage this flexibility to defend against our final counter-
measure (more in §7.2).
7 COUNTERMEASURES& ADAPTIVE
ATTACKS
Beyond static adversaries, any meaningful defense must withstand
countermeasures from adaptive attackers with knowledge of the de-
fense. As discussed in Section 3.1, we consider two types of adap-
tive adversaries: skilled adversaries who understand the target Fθ
could have trapdoors without specific knowledge of details, and or-
acle adversaries, who know all details about embedded trapdoors,
including their trapdoor shape, location, and intensity. Since the or-
acle adversary is the strongest possible adaptive attack, we use its
detection rate as the lower bound of our detection effectiveness.
Our exploration of countermeasures covers a number of adaptive
attacks, which we separate into two broad categories. First, we con-
sider approaches that attempt to detect and remove backdoors from
the target model Fθ , with the eventual intent of generating adver-
sarial examples from the cleaned model, and using them to attack
the deployed model Fθ . Second, we consider evasion approaches
that do not try to disrupt the trapdoor, and instead focus on finding
adversarial examples that cause the desired misclassification while
avoiding detection by the trapdoor defense.
We discuss our experimental results in detail. In each category,
we cover countermeasures from the weakest to the strongest. As we
will show, removal approaches fail because trapdoors significantly
alter loss functions, and even adversarial examples from the orig-
inal, trapdoor-free model do not transfer to the trapdoored model.
On the other hand, trapdoor defenses are robust against evasion
techniques, even when deployed by attackers with significant com-
putational resources.
7.1 Trapdoor Detection and Removal
Backdoor Countermeasures (Skilled Adversary). We start by
considering existing work on detecting and removing backdoors
from DNNs [27, 28, 37, 48]. A skilled adversary who knows that
a target model Fθ contains trapdoors may use existing backdoor
removal methods to identify and remove them. First, Liu et al. pro-
poses to remove backdoors by pruning redundant neurons (neuron
pruning) [27]. As previous work demonstrates [48], normal model
accuracy drops rapidly when pruning redundant neurons. Further-
more, pruning changes the decision boundaries of the pruned model
significantly from those of the original model. Hence, adversarial
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Table 6: Transferability of Adversarial Examples from a model
restored by unlearning, to its trapdoored counterpart.
Model CW EN PGD BPDA SPSA FGSM
GTSRB 1.5% 2.6% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 4.7%
CIFAR10 4.4% 4.4% 5.6% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0%
Youtube Face 3.6% 4.7% 0.0% 1.0% 1.2% 2.6%
examples that fool the pruned model do not transfer well to the orig-
inal, since adversarial attacks only transfer between models with
similarly decision boundaries [14, 44].
We empirically validated this countermeasure in pruned single-
label defended MNIST, GTSRB, CIFAR10, and YouTube Face mod-
els against the six different attacks.We prune neurons as suggested [27].
However, we observe that normal accuracy of the model drops rapidly
while pruning (> 32.23% drop). Due to the significant discrepancy
between the pruned and the original models, adversarial samples
crafted on the pruned model do not transfer to the original trap-
doored model. Attack success on the trapdoored model is < 4.67%.
More recent works in backdoor defenses [28, 37, 48] detect back-
doors by finding differences between normal and infected label(s).
All of these assume only one or a small number of labels are in-
fected by backdoors, so that they can be identified as anomalies.
Authors of Neural Cleanse [48] acknowledge that their approach
cannot detect backdoors if more than 36% of the labels are infected.
Similar, [37] uses the same technique and has the same limitations.
The authors of ABS [28] explicitly state that they do not consider
multiple backdoors. We experimentally validate this claimwithNeu-
ral Cleanse against all-label defended versions of MNIST, GTSRB,
CIFAR10, YouTube Face. All the trapdoors in our trapdoored mod-
els avoided detection.
Black-box/Surrogate Model Attacks (Skilled Adversary). A
skilled adversary aware of trapdoors in Fθ could use a black-box
model stealing attack [34], where they repeatedly query Fθ with
synthetic, generated inputs, and use the classification results to train
a local substitute model. Finally, the adversary generates adversarial
examples using the substitute model and used them to attack Fθ .
Black-box attacks must walk a fine line against trapdoors. To
generate adversarial examples that successfully transfer to Fθ , the
attacker must query Fθ repeatedly with inputs close to the classifi-
cation boundary. Yet doing so means that black-box attacks could
also import the trapdoors of Fθ into the substitute model.
We test the effectiveness of black box attacks by defending single
label GTSRB models as described in Section 6.2. We construct the
substitute model following [34] and use it to generate adversarial
attack images to attack our original model Fθ . In our tests, we con-
sistently observe that the substitute model does indeed inherit the
trapdoors from Fθ . A trapdoored model can reliably detect adver-
sarial examples generated from black-box substitute models with
> 95% success at 5% false positive rate, for all six attacks (FGSM,
PGD, CW, EN, BPDA, SPSA).
If somehow an attacker obtains access to the full training dataset
used by the model, and used it to build a surrogate model, she could
reproduce the original clean model. We consider this possibility
later in this subsection.
Table 7: Transferability of Adversarial Examples from an orig-
inal model trained by clean data to its trapdoored counterpart.
Model CW EN PGD BPDA SPSA FGSM
GTSRB 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 3.0% 1.0% 0.4%
CIFAR10 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.7% 2.8% 1.2%
Youtube Face 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 2.0% 1.4%
Unlearning the Trapdoor (Oracle Adversary). The goal of this
countermeasure is to completely remove trapdoors from the target
model Fθ , so that attackers can use it to that attackers can use it
to generate adversarial samples to attack Fθ . Prior work has shown
that adversarial attacks can transfer between models trained on sim-
ilar data [14, 44]. This implies that attacks may transfer between
cleaned and trapdoored versions of the target model.
For this we consider an oracle attacker, who knows everything
about a model’s embedded trapdoors, including its exact shape and
intensity. With such knowledge, oracle adversaries seek to construct
a trapdoor-free model by unlearning the trapdoors.
However, we find that such a transfer attack (between Fθ and
a version of it with the trapdoor unlearned Fθ
unlearn) fails. We
validate this experimentally using a single-label defended model.
The high level results are summarized in Table 6. We create a new
version of each trapdoored model using backdoor unlearning tech-
niques [5, 48], which reduce the trapdoor injection success rate
from 99% to negligible rates (around 2%). Unsurprisingly, the trap-
door defense is unable to detect adversarial samples constructed on
the cleaned model Fθ
unlearn , with only 7.42% detection success
rate at 5% FPR for GTSRB. However, these undetected adversarial
samples do not transfer to the trapdoored model Fθ . For all six at-
tacks and all four models, the attack success rate on Fθ ranges from
0% to 6.7%. We hypothesize that this might be because a trapdoored
model Fθ must learn unique trapdoor distributions that Fθ
unlearn
does not know. This distributional shift causes significant differ-
ences that are enough to prevent adversarial examples from trans-
ferring between models.
Oracle Access to the Original Clean Model. Unlearning is un-
likely to precisely recover the original clean model (before the trap-
door). Finally, we consider the strongest removal attack possible: an
oracle attacker that has somehow obtained access to (or perfectly re-
produced) the original clean model. We evaluate the impact of using
the original clean model to generate adversarial attacks on Fθ .
We are surprised to learn that adding the trapdoor has introduced
significant changes in the original clean model, and has thus de-
stroyed the transferability of adversarial attacks between them. In
Table 7, we show the transferability from clean models to their trap-
doored counterparts. For all 6 attacks and all models, transferability
is always never higher than 3%. This definitive result states that no
matter how successful an attacker is at removing or unlearning the
trapdoor, or if they otherwise rebuild the original model, their ef-
forts will fail because adversarial examples from these models do
not work on the trapdoored model Fθ that is the actual attack target.
7.2 Circumventing Trapdoor Detection
If even a clean version of the model cannot produce transferable
adversarial examples, an attacker might explore alternatives that
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Figure 9: Intuitive visualization of loss function for target label
in trapdoored models with low and high injection ratios.
Table 8: Comparison of learning rate and adversarial example
detection rate at 5% FPR on a GTSRB model.
Learning Rate
Detection Success Rate
Model with
Injection Ratio of 10%
Model with
Injection Ratio of 30%
0.1 97.34% 97.81%
0.01 96.30% 96.72%
0.001 86.90% 95.12%
0.0001 80.76% 92.32%
search for adversarial examples that avoid detection. Here we ex-
plore three such countermeasures: a) a reduced learning rate attack,
b) a lower-bound perturbation attack, and c) an optimization func-
tion for trapdoor avoidance.
Reduced Learning Rate Attack. We use the CW attack, and to
find examples that are not the trapdoor, we explore parameters in
the search for adversarial examples. We found that decreasing the
learning rate l is the only approach that yields meaningful results,
i.e. produces some scenarios where detection rate drops below 85%.
A small learning rate means the adversary moves more cautiously
through the loss landscape to search for adversarial perturbations.
As a result, the adversary may find a perturbation associated with
an original adversarial example (recall the intuition of adversarial
examples shown in Figure 2).
However, using a higher trapdoor injection ratio (training with
more trapdoor images) mitigates this attack. A higher injection ra-
tio embeds the trapdoor more deeply into the loss landscape of the
model. This stronger embedding smooths the manifold, effectively
removing other local minima an attacker could previously find us-
ing learning rate attacks (intuition shown in Figure 9).
Table 8 demonstrates how increasing the injection ratio can de-
fend low learning rate attacks. At a low injection ratio of 10%, de-
tection rate can fall to 80% when the attacker uses an extremely
low learning rate of 0.0001. If we increase the injection ratio to
30%, our trapdoored model can reliably detect adversarial examples
constructed using low learning rates. Numerous experiments show
that increasing the trapdoor injection ratio has minimal impact on
normal classification accuracy. Finally, we note that lower learning
rates require proportional increases in computational cost (# of iter-
ations). At some point, the geometric increase in search time will
become prohibitively large for the attacker.
Table 9: Detection success rate at 5% FPR and L2 norm of per-
turbation for the Lower Bound Perturbation Attack with differ-
ent values of R.
R L2 norm of Perturbation Detection Success Rate
0 0.05 100%
100 0.05 96.42%
1000 0.09 91.90%
10000 0.31 91.47%
100000 0.52 90.95%
1000000 0.53 90.71%
∞ 0.53 90.31%
Lower Bound Perturbation Attack. A key part of trapdoor-
enabled detection is that attackers optimize to find the smallest per-
turbation that causes misclassification to the target. Skilled adver-
saries can break this assumption by modifying their loss function
and adding a lower bound to the size of their adversarial perturba-
tions. Preventing the optimization algorithm from producing adver-
sarial perturbations smaller than some threshold R could in theory
find adversarial perturbations distinctive enough from the embed-
ded trapdoor to evade detection. For example, in the CW attack, the
attacker can modify the loss function:minϵ | |ϵ | |p+c ·ℓ(yt , Fθ (x+ϵ))
=⇒ minϵ (max(| |ϵ | |p − R, 0)) + c · ℓ(yt ,Fθ (x + ϵ))
We evaluate the effectiveness of such an adaptive attack by per-
forming the lower bounded CW attack against our GTSRB model
from Section 6.2. We vary R and evaluate detection success rate at
5% FPR. Table 9 shows the detection results and the L2 norm of
the perturbation with different values of R. Detection success rate
drops by 9.69% as we increase R from 0 to ∞ (when the L2 term
is completely removed from the loss function). At the same time,
the L2 norm of the perturbation increases by more than 10.6x. Thus,
the lower bounded adaptive attack only provides a small benefit for
evasion, even when allowing for (likely prohibitively) large pertur-
bations.
Optimizing to Avoid Trapdoor Signature. Finally, an oracle at-
tacker knows the Trapdoor, and can try to evade detection by jointly
minimizing the loss of the adversarial example and the probability
that the example is detected. The attacker knows that the defender
uses cosine similarity of a random set of neuron activations to de-
tect adversarial examples. Since attackers do not know the exact
neurons selected for each image, they can only approximate it by
arbitrarily selecting a set of neuron activations. From there, the at-
tacker needs to minimize the cosine similarity between the selected
neuron activation pattern of their attack and that of the known trap-
door. Mathematically, this joint attack loss function is written as:
min
ϵ
| |ϵ | |p + c · ℓ(yt ,Fθ (x + ϵ) + α · cos(hN (x + ϵ),hN (x + ∆t ))
where cos(.) represents the cosine similarity function between two
matrices, and hN is the set of neuron activations selected by the
attacker. Note that the defender randomly selects a set of neurons at
inference time to compute the neuron signature.
We evaluate the effectiveness of this attack using CW attack with
the updated loss function. We targeted the GTSRB model trained in
Section 6.2. Even with perfect knowledge of the embedded trap-
door, detection success at 5% FPR only drops to 76.59%. At the
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same time, L2 norm of the adversarial perturbations increases by
6.3x. Other models and attacks show similar results. We conclude
that the oracle attackers have limited effectiveness (18.84% drop in
detection accuracy) against trapdoor-enabled detection.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we propose to use honeypots to defend DNNs against
adversarial examples. Our proposed method trains trapdoors into
normal models to introduce controlled vulnerabilities (traps) into
the model. Trapdoors can defend all labels or particular labels of in-
terest. Across multiple application domains, our trapdoor-based de-
fense has high detection success against adversarial examples gen-
erated by a suite of state-of-the-art adversarial attacks, including
CW, ElasticNet, PGD, BPDA, FGSM, and SPSA, with negligible
impact on classification accuracy of normal inputs.
In addition to analytical proofs of the impact of trapdoors on
adversarial attacks, we evaluate and confirm trapdoors’ robustness
against multiple strong adaptive attacks, including black-box attacks,
unlearning attacks and trapdoor avoidance attacks by oracle adver-
saries with perfect knowledge of the trapdoor. These results suggest
that a honeypot defense for DNNs warrant additional attention and
exploration from the research community.
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APPENDIX
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1 & 2
Proof of Theorem 1
PROOF. This theorem assumes that after injecting the trapdoor
∆ into the model, we have
∀x ∈ X, Pr (Fθ (x + ∆) = yt , Fθ (x)) ≥ 1 − µ. (6)
When an attacker applies gradient-based optimization to find adver-
sarial perturbations for an input x targeting yt , the above equation
(6) implies that the partial gradient from x towards x + ∆ becomes
the major gradient to achieve the target yt . Note that Fθ (x) is the
composition of non-linear feature representation д(x) and a linear
loss function (e.g. logistic regression): Fθ (x) = д(x) ◦ L where L
represents the linear function. Therefore, the gradient of Fθ (x) can
be calculated via д(x):
∂lnFθ (x)
∂x
=
∂ln[д(x) ◦ L]
∂x
= c
∂lnд(x) ◦ L
∂x
(7)
Here c is the constant within the linear function L. To avoid ambigu-
ity, we will focus on the derivative on д(x) in the rest of the proof.
Given (7), we can interpret (6) in terms of the major gradient:
Px ∈X[
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ∆)]
∂x
≥ η] ≥ 1 − µ, (8)
where η represents, for the given x, the gradient value required to
reach yt as the classification result.
Next, since ∀x ∈ X, cos(д(A(x)),д(x + ∆)) ≥ σ , and σ → 1,
without loss of generality we have д(A(x)) = д(x + ∆) + γ where
|γ | << |д(x + ∆)|. Here we rewrite the adversarial input A(x) as
A(x) = x + ϵ. Using this condition, we can prove that the follow-
ing two conditions are true. First, because the value of γ does not
depend on x, we have
∂(д(x + ∆) + γ )
∂x
=
∂д(x + ∆)
∂x
. (9)
Furthermore, because |γ | << |д(x + ∆|), we have
1
д(x + ∆) + γ
≈
1
д(x + ∆)
. (10)
Leveraging eq. (8)-(10), we have
Px ∈X [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ϵ)]
∂x
≥ η]
=Px ∈X [
1
д(x)
∂д(x)
∂x
−
1
д(x + ϵ)
∂д(x + ϵ)
∂x
≥ η]
=Px ∈X [
1
д(x)
∂д(x)
∂x
−
1
д(x + ∆) + γ
∂(д(x + ∆) + γ )
∂x
≥ η]
≈Px ∈X [
1
д(x)
∂д(x)
∂x
−
1
д(x + ∆)
∂(д(x + ∆))
∂x
≥ η]
=Px ∈X [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ∆)]
∂x
≥ η]
≥1 − µ.

Proof of Theorem 2
PROOF. This theorem assumes that, after injecting the trapdoor
∆, we have
Px ∈Xtr ap [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ∆)]
∂x
≥ η] ≥ 1 − µ (11)
Following the same proof procedure in Theorem 1, we have
Px ∈Xtr ap [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ϵ)]
∂x
≥ η] ≥ 1 − µ (12)
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Table 10: Model Architecture for MNIST. FC stands for fully-
connected layer.
Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
Conv 16 5×5 1 ReLU
MaxPool 16 2×2 2 -
Conv 32 5×5 1 ReLU
MaxPool 32 2×2 2 -
FC 512 - - ReLU
FC 10 - - Softmax
Table 11: Model Architecture of GTSRB.
Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 32 2×2 2 -
Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 64 2×2 2 -
Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 128 2×2 2 -
FC 512 - - ReLU
FC 43 - - Softmax
Since Xtr ap and Xattack are ρ-covert, by definition (see eq. (5))
we have that for any event C ⊂ Ω, the largest possible difference be-
tween the following probabilities Px ∈Xattack [C] and Px ∈Xtr ap [C] is
bounded by ρ.
Next let C represent the event: (
∂[lnд(x )−lnд(x+ϵ )]
∂x ≥ η). We
have, for x ∈ Xattack ,
Px ∈Xattack [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ϵ)]
∂x
≥ η]
≥Px ∈Xtr ap [
∂[lnд(x) − lnд(x + ϵ)]
∂x
≥ η] − ρ
≥1 − (µ + ρ).

8.2 Experiment Configuration
Model Architecture. We now present the architecture of DNN
models used in our work.
• MNIST (Table 10) is a convolutional neural network (CNN) con-
sisting of two pairs of convolutional layers connected by max
pooling layers, followed by two fully connected layers.
• GTSRB (Table 11) is a CNN consisting of three pairs of convolu-
tional layers connected by max pooling layers, followed by two
fully connected layers.
• YouTube Face (Table 13) is the DeepID model trained on the
YouTube Face dataset. It has three convolutional layers (connected
by pooling layers) followed by three fully connected layers.
• CIFAR10 (Table 12) is also a CNN but includes 21 sequential
convolutional layers, followed by pooling, dropout, and fully con-
nected layers.
Table 12: ResNet20 Model Architecture for CIFAR10.
Layer Name (type) # of Channels Activation Connected to
conv_1 (Conv) 16 ReLU -
conv_2 (Conv) 16 ReLU conv_1
conv_3 (Conv) 16 ReLU pool_2
conv_4 (Conv) 16 ReLU conv_3
conv_5 (Conv) 16 ReLU conv_4
conv_6 (Conv) 16 ReLU conv_5
conv_7 (Conv) 16 ReLU conv_6
conv_8 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_7
conv_9 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_8
conv_10 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_9
conv_11 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_10
conv_12 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_11
conv_13 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_12
conv_14 (Conv) 32 ReLU conv_13
conv_15 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_14
conv_16 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_15
conv_17 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_16
conv_18 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_17
conv_19 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_18
conv_20 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_19
conv_21 (Conv) 64 ReLU conv_20
pool_1 (AvgPool) - - conv_21
dropout_1 (Dropout) - - pool_1
fc_ (FC) - Softmax dropout_1
Table 13: DeepID Model Architecture for YouTube Face.
Layer Name (Type) # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
conv_1 (Conv) 20 4×4 2 ReLU
pool_1 (MaxPool) 2×2 2 - conv_1
conv_2 (Conv) 40 3×3 2 ReLU pool_1
pool_2 (MaxPool) 2×2 2 - conv_2
conv_3 (Conv) 60 3×3 2 ReLU pool_2
pool_3 (MaxPool) 2×2 2 - conv_3
fc_1 (FC) 160 - - - pool_3
conv_4 (Conv) 80 2×2 1 ReLU pool_3
fc_2 (FC) 160 - - - conv_4
add_1 (Add) - - - ReLU fc_1, fc_2
fc_3 (FC) 1280 - - Softmax add_1
Detailed information on attack configuration. We evaluate the
trapdoor-enabled detection using six adversarial attacks: CW, Elas-
ticNet, PGD, BPDA, SPSA, and FGSM (which we have described
in Section 2.1). Details about the attack configuration are listed in
Table 15.
Sample Trapdoor Patterns. Figure 10 shows sample images that
contain a single-label defense trapdoor (a single 6 × 6 square) and
that contain an all-label defense trapdoor (five 3 × 3 squares). The
mask ratio of the trapdoors used in our experiments is fixed to κ =
0.1.
Datasets and Defense Configuration. Tablel 14 lists the specific
datasets and training process used to inject trapdoors into the four
DNN models.
Selecting Trapdoor Injection Ratio. As mentioned earlier, our
analysis shows that the size and diversity of the training data used
to inject a trapdoor could affect its effectivess of trapping attackers.
To explore this factor, we define trapdoor injection ratio as the ratio
between the trapdoored images and the clean images in the training
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Table 14: Detailed information on datasets and defense configurations for each trapdoored model.
Model
#
of Labels
Training
Set Size
Testing
Set Size
Per Label
Injection Ratio
Mask Ratio Training Configuration
MNIST 10 50,000 10,000 0.1 0.1 epochs=5, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001
GTSRB 43 35,288 12,630 0.1 0.1 epochs=30, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001
CIFAR10 10 50,000 10,000 0.1 0.1 epochs=100, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001
YouTube Face 1,283 375,645 64,150 0.01 0.1 epochs=30, batch=32, optimizer=Adadelta, lr=1
Table 15: Detailed information on attack configurations. For MNIST experiments, we divid the eps value by 255.
Attack Method Attack Configuration
CW binary step size = 20, max iterations = 500, learning rate = 0.1, abort early = False
PGD max eps = 8, # of iteration = 100, eps of each iteration = 1.0
ElasticNet binary step size = 20, max iterations = 500, learning rate = 0.5, abort early = False
BPDA max eps = 8, # of iteration = 100, eps of each iteration = 1.0
SPSA eps = 8, # of iteration = 500, learning rate = 0.1
FGSM eps = 8
(a) Single Label Defense Trapdoor (b) All Label Defense Trapdoor
Figure 10: Sample trapdoor examples used in our defense. While
the actual trapdoors we used all have a mask ratio of κ = 0.1, here
we artifically increase κ from 0.1 to 1.0 in order to highlight the
trapdoors from the rest of the image content.
dataset. Intuitively, a higher injection ratio should allow the model
to learn the trapdoor better but could potentially degrade normal
classification accuracy.
We defend the model with different trapdoor injection ratios and
examine the detection success rate. We see that only when the injec-
tion ratio is very small (e.g. < 0.03 for GTSRB), the model fails to
learn the trapdoor and therefore detection fails. Otherwise the trap-
door is highly effective in terms of detecting adversarial examples.
Thus when building the trapdoored models, we use an injection ra-
tio of 0.1 for MNIST, GTSRB, CIFAR1010, and 0.01 for YouTube
Face (see Table 15).
8.3 Additional Results on Comparing Trapdoor
and Adversarial Perturbation
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that the neuron signatures of adver-
sarial inputs have high cosine similarity to the neuron signatures of
trapdoors in a trapdoored CIFAR10 and YouTube Face models (left
figures), and the trapdoor-free models (right figures).
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(a) Trapdoored Model
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(b) Original Model
Figure 11: Comparison of cosine similarity of normal images and adversarial images to trapdoored inputs in a trapdoored CIFAR10
model and in an original (trapdoor-free) CIFAR10 model. The boxes show the inter-quartile range, and the whiskers denote the 5th
and 95th percentiles.
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(a) Trapdoored Model
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(b) Original Model
Figure 12: Comparison of cosine similarity of normal images and adversarial images to trapdoored inputs in a trapdoored YouTube
Face model and in an original (trapdoor-free) YouTube Face model. The boxes show the inter-quartile range, and the whiskers denote
the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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